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Markets versus Regulation: 
The Efficiency and Distributional Impacts of U.S. Climate Policy Proposals 
Sebastian Rausch*†‡ and Valerie J. Karplus 
Abstract 
Regulatory measures have proven the favored approach to climate change mitigation in the U.S., while 
market-based policies have gained little traction. Using a model that resolves the U.S. economy by 
region, income category, and sector-specific technology deployment opportunities, this paper studies the 
magnitude and distribution of economic impacts under regulatory versus market-based approaches. We 
quantify heterogeneity in the national response to regulatory policies, including a fuel economy 
standard and a clean or renewable electricity standard, and compare these to a cap–and–trade system 
targeting carbon dioxide or all greenhouse gases. We find that the regulatory policies substantially 
exceed the cost of a cap–and–trade system at the national level. We further show that the regulatory 
policies yield large cost disparities across regions and income groups, which are exaggerated by the 
difficulty of implementing revenue recycling provisions under regulatory policy designs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the absence of comprehensive legislation to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the 
United States, policymakers have been pursuing climate change mitigation through sector or 
technology-specific regulatory measures. Comprehensive climate policies would cover most or 
all sources of GHG emissions and incentivize reductions at least cost through a market 
mechanism—such as a carbon tax, cap–and–trade system, or hybrid instrument—by achieving 
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an equalization of marginal abatement costs across participants (Metcalf, 2009). Regulatory 
measures, by contrast, require that GHG emissions reductions be achieved through compliance 
with sector-specific technology or efficiency targets. Examples of such regulatory measures 
include new source performance standards for power plant pollutant emissions, vehicle fuel 
economy standards, renewable or low carbon fuel standards, and renewable or clean electricity 
standards. 
This paper examines the efficiency and distributional implications of federal regulation in the 
U.S. electric power and transportation sectors by employing a numerical simulation model with a 
unique treatment of regional, technology, and household income heterogeneity. The goal is to 
closely approximate current proposals implemented or under consideration in the U.S.
We investigate the impact on economy-wide costs and emissions reductions of introducing a 
clean energy standard (CES) or renewable portfolio standard (RPS), which would mandate the 
introduction of renewable generation (as well as other cleaner fuel sources in a CES), and a vehicle 
fuel economy standard modeled after the U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Program, 
which mandates increases in on-road fuel economy of new vehicles sold in each vehicle model 
year. We explore how the costs are distributed across households in different regions and income 
categories. We compare the cost effectiveness and the distribution of impacts of policies alone and 
in combination, and investigate the welfare impact of such policies relative to an efficient 
instrument (in this case, a cap–and–trade system that creates a market for emissions permits).1  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the numerical model used for quantitative 
policy assessments. Section 3 describes and interprets the model results. Section 4 performs a 
structural sensitivity analysis by investigating the impact of electricity policies in a coupled 
modeling framework that introduces a more detailed representation of technology. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. THE U.S. REGIONAL ENERGY POLICY (US REP) MODEL 
2.1 Data 
This study makes use of a comprehensive energy-economic data set that features a consistent 
representation of energy markets in physical units as well as detailed economic accounts of 
                                                
 
 
1 It is important to note that this paper does not aim at identifying any optimal mix of policy instruments, nor does it 
claim that an economy-wide cap–and–trade regulation is always the most cost-effective policy instrument. Cost-
effectiveness depends importantly on how policies interact with distortions in the economy created by the 
broader fiscal system (see, for example, Harberger, 1964; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Goulder et al., 1999). 
The costs of market-based policies that do not offset the tax-interaction effect with the revenue-recycling benefit 
can be dramatically higher, particularly for the scale of CO2 reductions considered here (Parry and Williams III, 
2011). Regulatory approaches targeted to individual sectors would thus be less attractive relative to a 
comprehensive cap–and–trade policy if the latter would exploit revenue recycling options. As we assume 
throughout the paper that the revenue from a federal cap–and–trade regulation is recycled lump-sum, the 
estimates concerning the relative cost-effectiveness of regulatory policies provided in this paper should be best 
viewed as providing a lower bound. 
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regional production, bilateral trade, and energy resources for the year 2006. The data set merges 
detailed state-level data for the U.S. with national economic and energy data. Social accounting 
matrices (SAM) in our hybrid data set are based on data from the IMPLAN (IMpact analysis for 
PLANning) data (IMPLAN, 2008) and U.S. state-level accounts of energy balances and prices 
from the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2009). Table 1 provides an overview of the 
data sources used. 
The IMPLAN data provide consistent regional accounts of production, consumption, and 
bilateral trade for the 50 U.S. states (and the District of Columbia). The data set includes input–
output tables for each state that identify 509 commodities and existing taxes. Bilateral state-to-
state trade data in the IMPLAN database are derived using a gravity approach (Lindall et al., 
2006).2 The base year for the IMPLAN accounts in the version we use here is 2006. To improve 
the characterization of energy markets in the IMPLAN data, we use constrained least-squares 
optimization techniques to merge IMPLAN data with data on physical energy quantities and 
energy prices from the Energy Information Administration’s State Energy Data System for 2006 
(EIA, 2009).3 
Table 1. Data sources for the energy-economic data set. 
Data and parameters Source 
Social accounting matrices IMPLAN (2008) 
    bi-lateral trade Gravity-based analysis (Lindall et al., 2006) 
    pooled energy trade  State Energy Data System (EIA, 2009) 
Physical energy flows & energy prices State Energy Data System (EIA, 2009) 
Fossil fuel reserves U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 2009) 
    and biomass supply U.S. Department of Energy (DOE, 2009), Dyni (2006) and Oakridge National Laboratories (2009) 
High-resolution wind data Wind Integration Data sets, National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL, 2010) 
Non-CO2 GHG inventories U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2009) 
    and endogenous costing Hyman et al. (2002) 
Marginal personal income tax rates NBER’s TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) 
Trade elasticities Global Trade Analysis Project (2008) and own  calibration 
Energy demand and supply elasticities Paltsev et al. (2005) 
Passenger vehicle transportation U.S. Department of Transportation (2009) 
 
                                                
 
 
2 The IMPLAN Trade Flows Model draws on three data sources: the Oak Ridge National Labs county-to-county 
distances by mode of transportation database, the Commodity Flows Survey (CFS) ton-miles data by commodity, 
and IMPLAN commodity supply and demand estimates by county. 
3 Aggregation and reconciliation of IMPLAN state-level economic accounts to generate a micro-consistent 
benchmark data set which can be used for model calibration is accomplished using ancillary tools documented in 
Rausch and Rutherford (2009). 
4 
 
Table 2. USREP model details. 
Regions 
• Pacific (PACIF) 
• California (CA) 
• Alaska (AK) 
• Mountain (MOUNT) 
• North Central (NCENT) 
• Texas (TX) 
• South Central (SCENT) 
• North East (NEAST) 
• South East (SEAST) 
• Florida (FL) 
• New York (NY) 
• New England (NENGL) 
Sectors 
Non-Energy sectors 
• Agriculture (AGR) 
• Services (SRV) 
• Energy-intensive products (EIS) 
• Other industries products (OTH) 
• Commercial Transportation (TRN) 
• Household vehicle transportation (HVT) 
Final demand sectors 
• Household transportation 
• Other household demand 
• Government demand 
• Investment demand 
Energy supply and 
conversion 
Fuels 
• Coal (COL) 
• Natural gas (GAS) 
• Crude oil (CRU) 
• Refined oil (OIL) 
Electricity (ELE) 
• Conventional fossil 
• Existing nuclear 
• Hydro 
Advanced energy 
supply technologies   (see Table 3) 
Primary 
production 
factors 
• Capital 
• Labor  
• Land 
• Wind resources 
• Hydro 
resources 
• Coal resources  
• Nuclear 
resources 
• Crude oil resources 
• Natural gas  
resources 
Household 
income classes 
($1,000 annually) 
<10 10-15 15-25 25-30 30-50 50-75 75-100 100-150 >150 
For this study, we aggregate the data set to 12 U.S. regions, 10 commodity groups, and 9 
households grouped by annual income classes (see Table 2). States identified in the model 
include California, Texas, Florida, and New York, along with several other multi-state regional 
composites. Mapping of states to aggregated regions is shown in Figure 1. This structure 
separately identifies larger states, allows representation of separate electricity interconnects, and 
captures some of the diversity among states in use and production of energy. Our commodity 
aggregation identifies five energy sectors and five non-energy composites. Energy commodities 
include coal (COL), natural gas (GAS), crude oil (CRU), refined oil (OIL), and electricity (ELE), 
which distinguishes energy goods and specifies substitutability between fuels in energy demand. 
Elsewhere, we distinguish energy-intensive products (EIS), other manufacturing (OTH), 
agriculture (AGR), commercial transportation (TRN), household vehicle transportation (HVT), 
and services (SRV). Primary factors in the data set include labor, capital, and land, as well as 
fossil fuels and natural resources. We forecast both CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Non-
CO2 greenhouse gases are based on U.S. EPA inventory data (EPA, 2009), and are included 
following the approach in Paltsev et al. (2005) with endogenous costing of abatement measures 
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(Hyman et al., 2002). Energy supply is regionalized by incorporating data for regional crude oil 
and natural gas reserves (DOE, 2009), coal reserves estimated by the U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS, 2009), and shale oil (Dyni, 2006). Our approach to characterize wind resource and 
incorporate electricity generation from wind in the model is described in detail in Section 4.1. 
We derive regional supply curves for biomass from data from Oakridge National Laboratories 
(2009) that describes quantity and price pairs for biomass supply for each state. 
Our data set permits calculation of existing tax rates comprised of sector and region-specific 
ad valorem output taxes, payroll taxes and capital income taxes. The IMPLAN data has been 
augmented by incorporating regional tax data from the NBER TAXSIM model (Feenberg and 
Coutts, 1993) to represent marginal personal income tax rates by region and income class.  
  
Figure 1. Regions in the USREP model. 
2.2 Model Overview 
Our modeling framework draws on a multi-commodity, multi-region, multi-household 
numerical general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. The key features of the model are 
briefly outlined below and described in detail in Rausch et al. (2010a, 2010b).4 The model 
assumes a recursive–dynamic approach implying that economic agents have myopic expectations 
and base their decisions on current period information. 
In each industry gross output is produced using inputs of labor, capital, and natural resources 
including coal, natural gas, crude oil, and land, and produced intermediate inputs. We employ 
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions to characterize how production technologies 
respond to changes in energy and other input prices; the IMPLAN data describe the initial 
production systems. All industries are characterized by constant returns to scale (except for fossil 
                                                
 
 
4 These papers also provide detail on the elasticities of substitution used to parameterize the model which we do not 
provide below. 
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fuels and agriculture, which are produced subject to decreasing returns to scale) and are traded in 
perfectly competitive markets. 
Advanced energy supply options are specified as “backstop” technologies that enter 
endogenously if and when they become economically competitive with existing technologies. 
Competitiveness of advanced technologies depends on their initial cost disadvantage compared 
to conventional technologies, in addition to the endogenously determined input prices. The 
advanced technology options are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3. Advanced energy supply technologies. 
 Technology Description 
Perfect 
Conventional  
Fossil Fuel 
Substitutes  
Coal gasification Converts coal into a perfect substitute for natural gas. 
Biomass liquids  Converts biomass into a perfect substitute for refined oil. 
Biomass electricity  Converts biomass into a perfect substitute for electricity 
Imperfect 
Conventional 
Fossil Fuel 
Substitutes 
Wind / no backup   Converts intermittent wind resources into an imperfect substitute for electricity. 
Wind / gas backup   Creates a perfect substitute for electricity by jointly building wind turbines and natural gas generation. 
Wind / biomass backup  Creates a perfect substitute for electricity by jointly building wind and biomass generation. 
Advanced gas Based on natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) technology that converts natural gas into electricity. 
Advanced gas / CCS Natural gas combined cycle technology that captures 90% or more of the CO2 produced in generating electricity. 
Advanced coal / CCS  
Integrated coal gasification combined cycle (IGCC) that 
captures 90% or more of the CO2 produced in 
generating electricity. 
Advanced nuclear 
Next generation of nuclear power plants incorporating 
estimated costs of building new nuclear power plants in 
the future. 
Three technologies produce perfect substitutes for conventional fossil fuels (natural gas from 
coal, a crude oil product from shale oil, and refined oil from biomass). The remaining nine are 
electricity generation technologies (biomass, wind without backup, wind with gas backup, wind 
with biomass backup, natural gas combined cycle with and without carbon capture and 
sequestration, integrated coal gasification combined cycle with and without carbon capture and 
sequestration, and advanced nuclear). We adopt a top-down approach of representing 
technologies following Paltsev et al. (2005, p. 31–42 ) where each technology can be described 
through a nested CES function. The logic behind our approach to representing electricity 
generated from intermittent wind resources is explained in detail in Section 4.1. 
Consumption, labor supply, and savings result from the decisions of representative 
households in each region maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint that requires that full 
consumption equals income in a given period. Lacking specific data on capital ownership, 
households are assumed to own a pool of U.S. capital—that is, they do not disproportionately 
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own capital assets within the region in which they reside.5 Given input prices gross of taxes, 
firms maximize profits subject to technology constraints. 
Firms operate in perfectly competitive markets and maximize their profit by selling their 
products at a price equal to marginal costs. In each region, a single government entity 
approximates government activities at all levels—federal, state, and local. 
We adopt a putty-clay approach where a fraction of previously installed capital becomes non-
malleable and frozen into the prevailing techniques of production. Vintaged production in a 
given industry that uses non-malleable capital is subject to a fixed-coefficient transformation 
process in which the quantity shares of capital, labor, intermediate inputs and energy by fuel type 
are set to be identical to those that prevailed in the period when the capital was installed. Each of 
the sector-specific vintages is tracked through time as a separate capital stock. This formulation 
means that the model exhibits a short-run and long-run response to changes in relative prices. 
The substitution response in a single period to a change in prices in that period is a combination 
of the long-run substitution possibilities, weighted by output produced by malleable capital, and 
no substitution, weighted by output produced with vintaged capital. 
With the exception of crude oil, which is modeled as a homogeneous good, intermediate and 
final consumption goods are differentiated following the Armington (1969) assumption. For each 
demand class, the total supply of a particular good is a CES composite of a domestically 
produced variety (i.e., locally produced and imported from domestic markets) and an imported 
(from foreign markets) one. As described in Rausch et al. (2010a), USREP models the U.S. as a 
large open economy with price-responsive imports and exports to and from international markets. 
All goods are tradable. Depending on the type of commodity, we distinguish three different 
representations of intranational trade. First, bilateral flows for all non-energy goods are 
represented as Armington goods, which like goods from other regions are imperfectly 
substitutable for domestically produced goods. Second, domestically traded energy goods, except 
for electricity, are assumed to be homogeneous products, i.e. there is a national pool that 
demands domestic exports and supplies domestic imports. This assumption reflects the high 
degree of integration of intra-U.S. markets for natural gas, crude and refined oil, and coal. Third, 
we differentiate six regional electricity pools that are designed to provide an approximation of 
the existing structure of independent system operators (ISO) and the three major interconnections 
in the U.S. More specifically, we distinguish the Western, Texas ERCOT and Eastern 
                                                
 
 
5 The ownership of natural resources and wind is, however, assumed to be regional. Lacking empirical data on 
ownership patterns from these resources, the alternative and extreme case would be to assume that income from 
natural resources is also distributed in proportion to capital. On one hand, the assumption of pooled ownership of 
capital tends to average out distributional impacts across the nation, while on the other hand, the assumption of 
regional ownership of natural resources may overestimate the size of regional impacts. 
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interconnections, and in addition identify AK, NENGL, and NY as separate regional pools.6 
Within each regional pool, we assume that traded electricity is a homogenous good, and that no 
electricity is traded among regional pools. 
Our framework incorporates a detailed representation of passenger vehicle transport that 
permits projections of vehicle-miles traveled (VMT), fleet stock turnover, and fuel price-induced 
investment in fuel efficiency. This permits studies of policies that target improvements in vehicle 
fuel efficiency, differentiate between newly purchased and pre-existing vehicle stocks in each 
period, and result in changes in overall vehicle-miles traveled as well as the fuel use and GHG 
emissions of new and pre-existing vehicles. These features are similar to those introduced into 
the MIT EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 2005) and are described in detail in Karplus et al. (2013b). 
Numerically, the equilibrium is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) 
(Mathiesen, 1985; Rutherford, 1995). Our complementarity-based solution approach comprises 
two classes of equilibrium conditions: zero profit and market clearance conditions. The former 
condition determines a vector of activity levels and the latter determines a vector of prices. We 
formulate the problem in GAMS and use the mathematical programming system MPSGE 
(Rutherford, 1999) and the PATH solver (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995) to solve for non-negative 
prices and quantities.  
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Scenarios 
Our core scenarios follow the policy scenarios defined in the EMF 24 U.S. study (see the 
overview paper of this study; Fawcett et al., 2012). In addition to a business-as-usual scenario 
(“BAU”, called “US01F”), 7 we consider the following six policy scenarios:  
(1) A national cap–and–trade policy that allows for cumulative GHG emissions from 2012 
through 2050 associated with a linear reduction from 2012 levels to 50% below 2005 
levels in 2050 (“CAT50%”, “US03F”) 
(2) A federal renewable portfolio standard for electricity which mandates that 20% by 2020, 
30% by 2030, 40% by 2040, and 50% by 2050 of electricity has to be produced from 
renewable energy (including hydropower), and that all new coal power plants capture and 
store more than 90% of their CO2 emissions (“Electricity (Coal+RPS)”, “US11F”) 
(3) A federal clean energy standard for electricity under which all renewable energy sources 
and nuclear receive full credit while fossil electricity with carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) technologies are credited at 90% and natural gas at 50% with targets defined as 
                                                
 
 
6 The regional electricity pools are thus defined as follows: NENGL, NY, TX and AK each represent a separate pool. 
The Western Interconnection comprises CA, MOUNT and PACIF. The Eastern Interconnection comprises 
NEAST, SEAST and FL. 
7 The first label specifies the scenario name used in this paper; the second label refers to the scenario name used in 
the overview piece of the EMF24 study. 
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linearly increasing from reference levels in 2012 to 50% by 2020, 60% by 2025, 70% by 
2030, 80% by 2035, 90% by 2040 and thereafter (“Electricity (Coal+CES)”, “US27F”) 
(4) A federal transport policy establishing a fuel economy standard for new light-duty 
vehicles that specifies a linear increase in the fuel economy of new vehicles, starting in 
2012, to 3 times 2005 levels sectors (“Electricity (Coal+RPS) and Transport”, “US05F”); 
(5) A scenario that combines both regulatory policies for the electricity and transportation 
sectors (“Electricity (Coal+RPS) and Transport”, “US05F”), transportation  
(6) A scenario that layers a federal cap–and–trade policy on top of the two sectoral policies 
(“Electricity (Coal+RPS) and Transport and CAT50%”, “US07F”) 
Throughout all scenarios—including the regulatory policy scenarios—real government 
spending is held fixed at the baseline (“BAU”) level through endogenous lump-sum transfers or 
taxes. These are assumed to be uniform across households in different regions and income classes. 
3.2 Cost Effectiveness 
The cost effectiveness of policy is inherently linked to abatement flexibility. Important 
sources of flexibility include the ability to allocate abatement across gases, sectors, technologies, 
and time. To the extent that target gas, sector, technology, and timetable are constrained, 
regulatory policies will impose equal or greater costs relative to an economy-wide market-based 
instrument with full flexibility (in a first-best setting). Adding regulatory policies in the presence 
of an economy-wide instrument also reduces abatement flexibility, as specified sectors or 
technologies deliver a portion of the overall reduction that would otherwise represent least cost 
solutions. These observations are consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature (Paltsev 
et al., 2009; Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010; Fischer and Preonas, 2010; Pethig and Wittlich, 
2009; del Rio Gonzalez, 2007). In contrast to both cap–and–trade instruments, all of the 
regulatory policies implemented, and as modeled here, are constrained to act on a target sector 
and fixed abatement schedule, significantly reducing abatement flexibility.8 
Our analysis illustrates the welfare penalties associated with reductions in abatement 
flexibility. Figure 2 shows for each policy the percentage change in cumulative GHG (or CO2 
emissions from 2012–2050 against the net present value of welfare change over the same period, 
expressed in trillion 2005$. Welfare costs are measured as equivalent variation relative to the 
baseline (no policy) scenario. The two solid lines show the “efficient” abatement frontier, i.e. the 
                                                
 
 
8 In the presence of distorted factor markets, however, it is not clear a priori that a cap-and-trade policy is superior in 
terms of welfare compared to a regulatory policy. Cap-and-trade policies may lead to a large increase in the price of 
consumption relative to a regulatory policy, thus implying a lower real wage and a larger reduction in labor supply. 
If there are pre-existing taxes on labor, the reduction in labor supply has a first-order efficiency cost, which has 
been termed the tax-interaction effect (Parry et al., 1998), and can be larger under a cap-and-trade relative to a 
regulatory policy. Similar effects might arise if intra- and intertemporal distortions associated with capital markets 
are corrected. However, regulatory policies fail to exploit the revenue-recycling effect, as they do not generate 
revenue that can be used to cut distortionary marginal tax rates. Initial exploratory analysis with the USREP model 
did find evidence for a strong tax-interaction effect that would make regulatory policies more cost effective. 
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locus of points that corresponds to the impact of a market mechanism (here modeled as a system 
of tradable permits). The frontiers are shown both for policies that constrain all GHGs or CO2 
only. Reducing coverage from all GHGs to CO2 alone adds to the cost of policy, corresponding 
to a shift of the frontier to the right. Both of these policies retain broad sectoral coverage and 
intertemporal flexibility through provisions for banking and borrowing.9 
The two frontiers corresponding to GHG and CO2 cap-and trade instruments in Figure 2 
provide a benchmark against which the various regulatory policies can be compared. We first 
consider combinations of cap–and–trade policies with regulatory instruments. At the national 
level we find that the welfare reduction generated by the CAT50% ranks among the smallest of 
all the policies, while it produces the largest total cumulative reduction. Adding the vehicle fuel 
economy and electricity regulations to the CO2 or GHG cap–and–trade policy increases the total 
discounted welfare cost by 60% or 90%, respectively. 
 
Figure 2. Net present value (NPV) of welfare cost and cumulative GHG emissions 
reductions of regulatory and market-based climate policies. NPV is calculated using an 
annual discount rate of 4%. “GHG-based” refers to CAT policies designed to achieve 
emissions reduction from multiple greenhouse gases based on their CO2 equivalents. 
“CO2-based” refers to CAT policies that only target CO2. 
All of the regulatory policies produce points located inside (and far from) the efficient frontier. 
Figure 2 shows the magnitude of the welfare penalty associated with each of the regulatory 
instruments in terms of how they compare to both the efficient frontiers as well as to each other. 
In all cases, the emissions reductions achieved are much lower, given that policies target modest 
reductions from specific sectors. These reductions, however, are achieved with far less cost-
effective solutions—for the same cost, a fuel economy standard (“transport”) or a renewable-
                                                
 
 
9 It should be noted that there may be cap-and-trade policies that are more cost effective due to exploiting the 
revenue-recycling effect. 
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energy based electricity standard (“Coal+RPS”) would achieve only one-fourth of the reductions 
attained under a cap–and–trade system. Put differently, an equivalent level of emissions 
reduction could be achieved under a cap–and–trade system for less than 5% of the cost of either 
regulatory policy. The large discrepancy can be traced back to abatement flexibility—regulatory 
policies imposed on the electricity or transportation sectors would encourage the application of 
only a subset of the abatement options that a cap–and–trade policy would employ. Indeed, the 
cost of combining the two regulatory policies exceeds that of a cap–and–trade system (1.1% 
compared to 0.9%), while the emissions reductions are barely half of the level achieved under a 
cap–and–trade system.  
 
Figure 3. Net present value (NPV) of welfare cost and cumulative GHG emissions 
reductions of regulatory and market-based climate policies for diﬀerent technology 
sensitivities. NPV calculated using an annual discount rate of 4%. Hollow circles refer to 
“Low CCS/Nuclear and High Renewable Energy” technology assumptions. Solid circles 
refer to “High CCS/Nuclear and Low Renewable Energy” technology assumptions. 
These results are not markedly affected by alternative assumptions for technology cost, as 
shown in Figure 3. We examine a case with low CCS/nuclear and high renewable energy costs 
and one with the reverse, high CCS/nuclear and low renewable energy costs. On the frontier, 
sensitivity of the total cost to changes in relative costs of these electricity sector abatement 
options initially increases with the magnitude of emissions reductions required, before 
decreasing again at reduction levels upwards of around 125 Gt CO2 -e, suggesting that at higher 
levels of reduction the relative costs no longer affect technology deployment decisions at the 
margin. The direction of the effect in the electricity scenarios depends on the role of renewable 
energy and carbon capture and storage (CCS) as the preferred solution under the policy 
constraint: high cost renewable energy increases the cost of compliance in the “Coal+RPS” 
scenario, but has less of an effect in the “Coal+CES” policy given that other low carbon 
alternatives, particularly natural gas, can be used to comply with the policy. The GHG emissions 
reduction trajectories under each policy over time are shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. U.S. GHG emissions over time. 
3.3 Effect on Emissions by Sector 
We now turn to consider the distribution of impacts by sector, shown in Table 4. The cap–
and–trade policy elicits broad sectoral participation (we focus here only on the GHG policy), 
with the reduction burden spread across the electricity, agriculture, energy-intensive industries, 
manufacturing, and commercial transport sectors. Private transport, by contrast, proves to be a 
relatively costly abatement option, consistent with other studies, and does not participate 
significantly in the least-cost response (Karplus et al., 2013a; Davidson and van Essen, 2009; 
Schafer and Jacoby, 2006). Under a policy that targets private and commercial transport, 
reductions in these sectors (19% and 18%, respectively) substantially exceed those resulting 
under a cap–and–trade system, with additional modest reductions in other sectors resulting from 
the indirect effects on income and prices imposed by the policy. Combining electricity and 
transport regulatory policies results in nearly additive total reductions (14%), given that these 
activities are largely separate and co-benefits are limited.
Comparing the cap–and–trade policy combined with regulatory policies to the cap–and–trade 
policy imposed alone, we find that the regulatory policies significantly increase the contribution 
of the electricity and transport sectors to overall abatement at the expense of more cost effective 
abatement opportunities in agriculture, energy-intensive industries, and manufacturing. For 
example, the contribution of the energy-intensive industries to overall abatement drops from 
23% to 14% when both regulatory policies are added to a cap–and–trade system, and similar 
decreases are observed for agriculture, manufacturing, and services. This response is also due to 
the lower allowance prices under the approaches that involve the regulatory policies as these 
policies shift the burden on the regulated industries and off the non-regulated sectors of the 
economy.  
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Table 4. Percentage change in cumulative (2012–2050) U.S. GHG emissions by sector and 
sectoral contribution to overall abatement. 
 CAT 50% Transport Electricity (Coal+RPS) 
Electricity 
(Coal+CES) 
Electricity 
(Coal+RPS) 
+Transport 
Electricity 
(Coal+RPS) 
+Transport 
+CAT 50% 
All Sectors -22 -7 -6 -7 -14 -25 
Commercial 
transport -8 (9) -19 (68) -0 (1)  0.0 (-0) -20 (37) -21 (21) 
Private 
transport -3 (2) -18 (37)  0 (-0)  0 (-1) -18 (20) -19 (12) 
Electricity -33 (44)  1 (-5) -20 (95) -25 (99) -18 (40) -28 (34) 
Agriculture -45 (16)  2 (-2) -1 (2) -1 (1)  1 (-0) -41 (13) 
Energy-intensive 
industries -23 (10)  2 (-3) -0 (0)  1 (-1)  2 (-1) -14 (5) 
Refined oil -24 (5) -17 (10)  0 (0) -0 (0) -17 (5) -27 (5) 
Manufacturing -44 (12)  5 (-4) -1 (1) -1 (1)  4 (-2) -35 (9) 
Services -25 (3)  1 (-0) -3 (1) -1 (0) -2 (0) -20 (2) 
Note: Figures before parentheses refer to percentage change in emissions by sector relative to “business-as-usual”. 
Figures in parentheses refer to sectoral emissions reductions as a percentage of total abatement relative to 
“business-as-usual”. 
Since the electricity sector plays a major role in abatement in most of the policy scenarios 
considered, we investigate the impact on the composition of the electricity generation mix. 
Figure 5 shows the electricity mix in 2030 and 2050 under each of the policy scenarios. Total 
electricity demand is reduced most significantly in both CAT50% scenarios as the GHG price 
and/or mandated technology adoption under regulation raises the marginal cost of electricity 
generation, leading to a reduction in total electricity demand. 
 
Figure 5. U.S. electricity generation mix by 2030 and 2050. 
The regulatory policies have mixed effects. The “Coal+RPS” and “Coal+CES” policies 
produce similar outcomes—a difference is that coal is reduced less in the RPS case in part 
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because the policy is less stringent relative to the CES policy by 2050. The role of nuclear in the 
electricity sector declines in all cases between 2030 and 2050, as existing capacity is assumed in 
our model to be phased out amid a lack of public policy support for new construction. Wind 
electricity plays an important role in all scenarios that target the electricity sector, largely at the 
expense of coal. Natural gas continues to play a significant role in all policies, while the little 
remaining oil use in electricity is reduced under all policies (except for transport).  
For the nation as a whole, electricity prices (shown in Figure 6) increase most under a cap–
and–trade policy, as the emissions price is reflected in the cost of electricity generation. An 
electricity policy only results in modest price increases as power producers shift to mandated and 
more costly generating technologies to comply with policy, and the reductions required by the 
electricity policies modeled here prove to be smaller than under a cap–and–trade system. In the 
scenario that combines the cap–and–trade system and regulatory policies, the electricity price 
does not rise as much as it would under a cap–and–trade system alone. This is because the 
regulatory policies achieve some of the abatement that would otherwise need to be induced by a 
carbon price signal. In other words, because regulatory policies already require significant 
reductions through mandated technology changes, the sectoral burden of emissions reductions 
shifts, with electricity contributing only 34% of total reductions, relative to 44% under a cap and 
trade system with no regulatory policies. The price needed to achieve the balance of reductions 
will inevitably be lower. 
  
Figure 6. Percentage change in electricity price by region (relative to “business-as-usual”). 
3.4 Welfare Impact by Region and Income Category 
National welfare impacts and aggregate technology and emissions responses can mask 
significant regional variation. The regional incidence of policy can be an important determinant 
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of policy support, and a detailed understanding of incidence can help to inform design of policy 
that addresses equity as well as efficiency concerns. 
To explain variation in the welfare impacts across these categories, we consider existing 
regional heterogeneity and detailed model forecasts of energy system characteristics under each 
policy scenario, and link changes in welfare to changes to energy prices, changes in the electricity 
mix, and region and income-specific electricity demand, vehicle ownership, and travel patterns. 
3.4.1 Regional Welfare Impact 
Table 5 summarizes the regional welfare cost expressed in both percentage of full income and 
in annual dollars per household. We find significant variation in costs across regions, which is 
reflected in the regional availability and cost effectiveness of abatement strategies. Comparing 
the cap–and–trade policy (CAT50%) with and without the regulatory policies, the per-household 
annual welfare impacts are larger and more negative under the combined policy case in every 
region except for the Texas and Mountain regions, which benefit from abundant and cost-
effective wind resources. Within individual regions, there is not an additive relationship in 
welfare change across any of the policies considered here. 
Table 5. Net present value of equivalent variation of income by region. 
  
CAT 50% 
Electricity 
(Coal+RPS) 
Electricity 
(Coal+RPS) 
+ Transport 
 
Transport 
Electricity 
(Coal+RPS) 
Electricity 
(Coal+CES) 
 % $/hh % $/hh % $/hh % $/hh % $/hh % $/hh 
NY 1.1 794 2.2 1601 2.3 1690 2.0 1479 0.4 307 0.7 552 
SCENT 1.1 707 1.3 788 1.9 1112 1.0 479 0.5 418 0.4 357 
SEAST 0.6 341 0.8 414 1.2 592 0.3 65 0.6 434 0.7 377 
NEAST 0.6 398 1.1 740 1.2 797 1.0 338 0.6 509 0.7 487 
FL 0.6 177 1.3 659 1.4 617 0.6 189 0.8 545 0.9 464 
NCENT 0.6 437 0.9 492 1.2 744 1.0 259 0.4 334 0.6 455 
TX 0.5 334 0 72 0.5 324 -0.2 -157 0.2 320 0.3 321 
MOUNT 0.4 252 0.6 103 0.9 229 1.0 235 0 -36 0.3 207 
CA 0.2 82 1.0 593 1.0 549 0.9 562 0.3 163 0.6 456 
PACIF 0.2 22 0.1 534 0.4 295 1.0 277 -0.5 -721 0 -118 
NENGL -0.3 -355 0.4 205 0.3 9 0.2 33 0.4 275 0.6 413 
US 0.5 307 0.9 510 1.1 615 1.0 308 0.4 305 0.6 386 
Note: Positive numbers show welfare losses; negative numbers show gains. NPV calculated using an annual 
discount rate of 4%. “%” refers to EV as percent of full income. “$/hh” refers to annual average of NPV of EV in 
2005$ per household. 
The extent of effects can be quantified by evaluating the regional impacts of policies alone, in 
combination, and by comparison. For example, the sum of the welfare changes due to the 
transport and electricity (Coal+RES) policies individually does not equal the welfare change 
under the policies combined—in some regions, the welfare impact under the combined policies 
is less (better) than additive (e.g., New York), while in other regions welfare loss is larger (worse) 
than additive (e.g., South Central). 
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Regional welfare impacts under the electricity policies can largely be explained by the 
region’s starting grid mix and the cost and availability of clean alternatives (particularly wind), 
which are shown in Figure 7. Some regions are not strongly affected—regions with generally 
cleaner grids (California, New York, New England) need not undergo significant changes under 
any of the policy scenarios considered, and experience less welfare loss. Other regions, 
particularly those with substantial wind resources (Texas, South Central, North Central, 
Mountain), bring significant shares of wind generation online, largely at the expense of coal 
generation. The RPS policy, alone or in combination with a cap–and–trade policy, brings wind 
generation earlier to more regions where it is not economically viable under a cap–and–trade 
policy alone (California, Florida, and to some extent New York). In other regions, responses vary 
depending on the policy type and stringency, with electricity production in the Southeast and 
Northeast reduced substantially under a cap–and–trade system. However, these impacts are 
mitigated in a case where a RPS is combined with the cap. In the model new technologies face 
initial cost hurdles associated with ramping up production capacity and early stage development 
risks. Once these hurdles are overcome, cost-competitive technologies will be introduced into the 
new capital stock, assuming constant returns to scale. By encouraging early deployment of wind 
technology, low-cost wind capacity is available later on and can be scaled up without facing the 
large initial cost penalty in the period through 2050.  
 
Figure 7. Regional electricity generation by source (EJ per year). 
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The impetus for these responses is captured in the regional electricity prices that emerge 
under each policy scenario. The largest price increases occur in the Southeast and Northeast 
(over 100% in 2050), while the electricity markets of New England and California are the least 
affected (in percentage terms). Different combinations of policies also produce regionally 
distinct price responses—a cap–and–trade system results in a decrease or very modest increase in 
electricity prices in New England and California, respectively, in 2030, reflecting each region’s 
relatively clean grid mix. Electricity regulatory policies also result in only a modest price 
increase in these regions. However, in other regions (for instance, Southeast and Northeast) 
regulatory and market-based policies require significant changes in the grid mix relative to 
business-as-usual, which is reflected in electricity price increases that are much larger, 
particularly in the cap–and–trade policy scenario, as advanced electricity technologies remain 
costly in the absence of early deployment that would bring down costs over time. 
To explain welfare losses associated with the transport policy, it is necessary to consider how 
the policy affects vehicle and fuel costs as they interact with diverse household preferences for 
vehicle ownership, efficiency and driving. As shown in Table 6, household expenditures devoted 
to vehicle transport as a percentage of total transport expenditures vary significantly across both 
regions and income categories. Regional differences can be related back to the local availability 
of alternatives to vehicle travel, as well as regional income, residential density, and road 
infrastructure, and are captured in the base year data set and initial share parameters. 
Table 6. Mode shares and household expenditure share on vehicle transport (base year 2006). 
 Share of household miles traveled by household owned vs. purchased transport Average 
share on 
vehicle 
transport  
 Income class 
 <10   10–15 15–25 25–30 30–50 50–75 75–100 100–150 >150 
CA 74.2 78.6 84.8 72.8 87.7 80.7 82.9 84.6 80.3 4.9 
FL 82.8 85.9 85.8 78.9 91.4 87.2 90.6 89.8 86.8 9.6 
NY 52.8 75.3 75.9 66.0 84.2 79.5 80.3 82.8 78.6 11.5 
TX 83.1 91.3 94.7 87.6 97.5 98.6 98.9 100.0 100.0 6.6 
NENGL 78.6 87.1 93.2 77.5 87.9 82.3 89.1 86.8 84.6 12.1 
SEAST 80.7 86.1 91.6 81.6 92.9 88.2 91.8 90.5 89.4 9.9 
NEAST 79.1 83.4 86.1 77.0 90.5 85.4 87.0 86.5 86.2 13.6 
SCENT 85.9 92.7 96.5 81.1 95.4 94.0 98.2 95.6 95.4 10.0 
NCENT 84.3 90.9 82.7 78.0 92.2 88.7 89.7 91.7 92.5 13.6 
MOUNT 74.2 87.8 92.0 76.9 92.4 86.9 92.9 89.9 90.2 12.0 
PACIF 84.0 94.8 79.8 72.0 87.8 83.6 90.3 82.7 84.0 11.7 
U.S. 6.2 8.4 10.5 6.3 13.0 10.2 12.8 12.1 11.1 10.8 
Note: Authors’ own calculations based on U.S. Department of Transportation (2009). Average U.S. expenditure 
share on vehicle transport by income class. 
When explaining welfare losses due to transport policy (shown in Table 5), it is important to 
recognize that the welfare loss is always expressed relative to the counterfactual, and so the 
degree of fuel efficiency improvement in the reference scenario is an important determinant of 
regional welfare loss under policy. Large welfare losses in New York (-2%) can be explained by 
the fact that relative to the reference scenario, vehicles sold in New York must realize significant 
18 
 
increases in fuel economy to achieve policy compliance. Given that a relatively large fraction of 
total passenger travel in New York does not occur in vehicles (47% for lowest income category), 
an increase in fuel prices (which results from increasing resource scarcity) would also 
significantly affect energy demand by purchased modes, which are not covered under the policy. 
A fuel economy standard instead forces fuel conservation to be achieved through vehicle fuel 
efficiency, while use of refined oil in other sectors is indirectly subsidized. Significant welfare 
losses also occur in New England, North Central, Mountain, and Pacific States (all 1.0%), given 
the large changes induced by the standard. Fuel economy improvement under the different 
policies is shown in Table 7. The table shows how the transport policy results in fuel economy 
improvements far in excess of those that occur with a cap–and–trade system as part of a 
comprehensive economy-wide GHG reduction program. 
Table 7. New (zero to five years old) vehicle on-road fuel economy over time (miles per 
gallon). 
 Base BAU Transport CAT 50% 
 
2006 2030 2050 
Compound 
annual 
growth rate 
2006–2050 
2030 2050 
Compound 
annual 
growth rate 
2006–2050 
2030 2050 
Compound 
annual 
growth rate 
2006–2050 
CA 23.2 24.0 25.0 0.17 31.1 43.7 1.45 24.6 26.2 0.27 
FL 25.9 27.4 29.5 0.29 36.6 53.5 1.66 27.8 30.5 0.37 
MOUNT 24.3 25.6 27.2 0.25 33.0 46.8 1.50 25.9 28.0 0.32 
NCENT 23.8 24.7 25.9 0.20 31.6 43.8 1.40 25.1 26.7 0.27 
NEAST 23.4 24.2 25.1 0.16 31.5 43.9 1.44 24.7 26.2 0.25 
NENGL 28.2 29.8 32.0 0.28 38.9 55.0 1.53 29.9 32.5 0.32 
NY 26.6 27.6 29.0 0.20 36.5 51.5 1.52 28.1 29.9 0.27 
PACIF 23.2 23.8 24.7 0.15 30.5 42.0 1.36 24.3 25.7 0.24 
SCENT 23.5 24.5 25.7 0.21 32.3 46.2 1.55 25.0 26.9 0.31 
SEAST 24.6 25.6 27.1 0.22 33.0 46.2 1.45 26.0 27.9 0.29 
TX 22.2 23.6 25.3 0.29 30.7 44.0 1.56 24.0 26.1 0.36 
Note: U.S. Department of Transportation (2009) and model forecast. 
In all three policy scenarios, motor gasoline prices by region change significantly in 2030 
relative to 2006. By raising the cost of gasoline proportional to carbon content, a cap–and–trade 
policy discourages refined oil use, leading to both lower price (net of the carbon charge) and 
demand. This downward price pressure is even stronger under the transport policy (fuel economy 
standard), because the transport policy displaces significantly more oil demand than the cap–
and–trade system. While there is a relationship between the price change and the regional 
welfare loss, the price signal captures many potentially offsetting forces acting on the supply-
demand balance, such as the household reliance on vehicle use, mode substitution potential, and 
different initial prices by region, and so price changes do not by themselves explain the welfare 
outcomes (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Percentage change in motor gasoline prices by region relative to 2006. 
3.4.2 Welfare Impact by Income Category 
An important question for policymakers is whether policies are regressive or progressive 
across income groups. We examine the impact of five of the above policies across nine income 
groups in the USREP model. We find the cap–and–trade and fuel economy policies to be 
moderately progressive, but the two electricity policies yield regressive welfare outcomes (see 
Figure 9). The results in the cap-and-trade case can be largely explained by the fact that revenue 
from the cap–and–trade policy is returned to households as a per-capita lump-sum transfer, while 
the owners of capital, concentrated in the higher income categories, must bear the costs of 
retrofitting or replacing capital to achieve policy compliance.  
 
Figure 9. Percentage change in net present value of equivalent variation by income. 
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Electricity policies have a regressive effect. Lower income households tend to spend a larger 
fraction of their budget on electricity for heating, cooking, and other residential use. If policy 
drives up electricity prices by imposing technology requirements on generation and distribution 
providers, the cost will be felt most acutely by low-income households. For a vehicle fuel 
economy standard, progressive welfare impacts are consistent with the intuition that many of the 
poorest households do not own vehicles or own used vehicles, which are not directly affected by 
the fuel economy standard (which focuses on new vehicles). The relative emphasis households in 
each region and income category assign to purchased relative to own-supplied (vehicle) modes is 
captured in Table 6, which also shows the average share of household expenditures on vehicle 
transport by region and income. Higher income households tend to own more vehicles and also 
drive them more. Households with higher incomes are also likely to include more members and 
thus to own more vehicles and travel more, leaving them potentially more affected by a vehicle 
price increases. With combined electricity and transport policies, low-income households 
shoulder a disproportionate burden of electricity policy costs, while wealthier households more 
acutely feel the impact of higher vehicle prices. The combined electricity and transport policy 
still yields a mildly progressive effect. 
A comparison of the annual average net present value of welfare loss by income category 
under each of the policy scenarios is shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Per-household annual average of net present value of welfare cost by income 
group (in $2005). 
Annual 
income 
group 
($1,000) 
Fraction of 
pop. (%) 
CAT 
50% 
Electricity 
(Coal+RPS) 
& Transport 
Electricity 
(Coal+RPS) 
& Transport 
& CAT 50% 
Transport Electricity (Coal+RPS) 
Electricity 
(Coal+CES) 
<10 7.3 -546 162 -188 -63 314 357 
10-15 4.4 -218 240 63 19 291 329 
15-25 9.5 -95 285 180 54 312 354 
25-30 9.8 79 318 238 71 338 389 
30-50 14.3 300 581 673 315 356 422 
50-75 19.9 598 549 805 327 336 426 
75-100 13.5 637 755 1034 555 318 432 
100-150 12.8 691 753 1076 642 239 369 
>150 8.5 956 772 1261 778 136 281 
All 100 307 510 615 308 305 386 
Note: Positive numbers show welfare losses; negative numbers show gains. NPV calculated using an annual 
discount rate of 4%. 
4. TOP-DOWN VS. BOTTOM-UP REPRESENTATION OF THE ELECTRICITY 
SECTOR 
The current research paradigm for ex-ante carbon policy assessment mainly involves two 
classes of models (see, e.g., Hourcade et al., 2006, for an overview). On one hand, technology-
rich “bottom-up” models provide a detailed representation of generation technologies and the 
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overall electricity system. On the other hand, economy-wide “top-down” models represent 
sectoral economic activities and electricity generation technologies through aggregate production 
functions. While these models are designed to incorporate general equilibrium effects, the use of 
smooth functions is not well-suited to capture the temporal and discrete nature of technology 
choice.10 
This section explores the implications of alternative structural models for the electricity sector. 
We compare two versions of USREP: a version that is based on a “top-down” representation of 
electricity—and that has been used for the analysis in the previous sections—with a version that 
features a detailed linear programming “bottom-up” load dispatch and capacity expansion model 
of the electricity sector. Our comparison focuses on the electricity-only policies, i.e. “Electricity 
(Coal+RPS)” and “Electricity (Coal+CES)”. 
While both modeling paradigms have been shown to produce similar results when focusing on 
conventional fossil-based electricity generating technologies, there exist significant differences 
in terms of how large-scale electricity generation from intermittent renewable energy sources is 
represented. We aim to obtain first insights into the question to what extent a relatively 
parsimonious “top-down” specification of the electricity sector can capture relevant key features 
of a structurally explicit “bottom-up” approach.11 More specifically, our analysis will focus on 
the following questions: How do both models compare in terms of electricity generation fuel mix? 
Do the models roughly agree with respect to the projected role of renewable energy under 
aggressive renewable energy policies for the electricity sector? How are electricity prices 
impacted? What are the implications for economic costs of decarbonizing the electricity sector 
both at the aggregate and regional level? 
Our comparison is motivated by the fact that many modeling groups (e.g., USREGEN, 
NewEra, and ADAGE in this special issue) have recently undertaken substantial efforts to 
integrate a “bottom-up” electricity sector model within a large-scale CGE model.12 However, we 
                                                
 
 
10 In addition, top-down representations of the electricity sector violate basic energy conservation principles outside 
of the benchmark calibration point (see Sue Wing, 2008). 
11 Of course, if one is interested in model projections that provide very high resolution in terms of, for example, 
spatial, temporal, and technology dimensions, a detailed “bottom-up” approach may be more appropriate. 
12 The integration of bottom-up technology representation and economy-wide interactions into “hybrid” models is 
the subject of a large literature. For example, reference is often made to “soft-linked” models, where the 
combination of the two models either fails to achieve overall consistency (Hofman and Jorgenson, 1976; Hogan 
and Weyant, 1982; Drouet et al., 2005; Jacoby and Schäfer, 2006), or complements one type of model with a 
“reduced-form” representation of the other, thereby lacking structural explicitness (Messner and Schrattenholzer, 
2000; Bosetti et al., 2006; Manne et al., 2006; Strachan and Kannan, 2008). An alternative and more recent 
approach, referenced to as “hard-linked”, is to directly embed a set of discrete generation technologies into a top-
down model (Böhringer, 1998; Sue Wing, 2006; Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008). Under this approach, 
however, the representation of technological detail significantly increases the dimensionality of the model, thus 
severely constraining large-scale applications. Finally, a decomposition algorithm by Böhringer and Rutherford 
(2008) employs an iterative solution procedure to solve top-down and bottom-up model components consistently. 
This approach is essentially a soft-linked approach, but overcomes issues of dimensionality and consistency, and 
has been employed in the context of U.S. climate policy in Sugandha et al. (2009) and Rausch and Mowers (2012). 
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are not aware of any attempt in the literature that compares both modeling paradigms through a 
set of unified scenarios. While it is not possible to validate models used for ex-ante policy 
analysis, we believe that such a comparison can offer insights into the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of each approach. 
4.1 A “Top-Down” CGE Approach to Modeling Large-Scale Renewable Electricity 
Generation 
The top-down approach to modeling electricity generation in energy-economy CGE models 
involves a representative firm that minimizes production costs subject to technological, 
institutional and resource constraints. Electricity generation, as any other production activity, is 
typically described by a nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function that combines 
energy, capital, labor and intermediate inputs from other sectors. The CES nesting structure for 
electricity generating technologies listed in Tables 2 and 3 is described in Paltsev et al. (2005). 
Here, we provide a sketch of our approach to modeling electricity generated from wind 
energy.13 Using the “calibrated share form” (Rutherford, 1998), electricity generated by wind 
technology Wind without backup, Wind with 100% natural gas backup, Wind with 100% 
biomass backup , at time  in region , , is in equilibrium determined by the following zero-
profit condition: 
 
 (1) 
⊥   
 
where  is the output price of electricity which is treated as a homogenous commodity.  
is a CES price index of energy, capital, labor, and other inputs.  denotes the price of a 
fixed factor wind resource,  denotes the benchmark value share of the fixed factor and  is 
the elasticity of substitution between the resource and non-resource inputs. 
It can be shown that the own-price price elasticity of electricity supply generated from wind 
using technology ,  is related to  as follows (assuming a stable price for variable factors, 
i.e.  ≡ 1): 
 (2) 
                                                
 
 
13 A similar logic could be applied to represent electricity generation from any other intermittent renewable energy 
source. 
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 is a multiplicative mark-up factor that describes the cost of the first MWh of wind 
generated with technology  relative to a benchmark electricity generating technology, i.e. 
pulverized coal. 
The resource input, , is technology-specific, and is in fixed supply for any given period. 
Observations on penetration rates for new technology typically show a gradual penetration, for 
which there are numerous contributing factors. USREP replicates the penetration behavior that is 
typically observed by endowing each regional economy with a small amount of a specialized 
wind resource. The endowment of this resource grows as a function of output  in the 
previous period: 
 (3) 
Capacity expansion is thus constrained in any period by the amount of this fixed factor 
resource and the ability to substitute other inputs for it. As electricity generation from wind 
expands over time the endowment is increased, and it eventually is not a significant limitation on 
capacity expansion. 
To characterize the wind resource by USREP region, we need to estimate for each region a 
pair . We use high-resolution wind data from NREL’s Wind Integration Data sets 
(NREL, 2010) providing capacity factors and maximum output for wind turbines if they were 
located at sites across the U.S.14 
For each potential wind site , we execute a levelized cost of electricity model, described in 
Morris et al. (2010), that calculates the levelized cost of electricity of using technology  on that 
site, . Based on an own-price elasticity formulation we use ordinary least-squares to fit: 
 if  (4) 
where  is electricity output,  is the estimated intercept, and is an error term. The 
logarithmic formulation means that the estimated coefficient  is a (constant) price elasticity 
of supply. Exploiting the relationship in Eq. (2), we can incorporate estimated wind supply 
curves into the model. 
The technology-specific markup-up factor is then given by: 
  (5) 
where  and  denote the LCOE for the least-cost wind site and the 
benchmark electricity generating technology, respectively. 
                                                
 
 
14 Identified sites take into account land use restrictions and make particular assumptions about turbine technology 
and density of turbine placements. The data set includes on- and offshore wind sites. 
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This deliberately simple approach is not without drawbacks. It has to rely on a strong 
assumption about backup capacity for non-dispatchable renewable electricity generating 
technology. Marcontonini and Parsons (2010) point out that LCOE is not an appropriate metric 
for comparing the economics of renewable generation with the economics of non-renewable 
generation technologies that are dispatchable. An implicit assumption behind the LCOE is that 
each generation technology is designed to produce base-load power. The solution to this problem 
adopted in USREP is to evaluate a synthetic base-load technology created by combining wind 
generation capacity together with 100% of backup capacity, so that the combination is able to be 
dispatched and a base-load profile of production can be assured. The upshot of this approach is 
that it provides only an upper bound on the economic cost of renewable technologies implying 
that the renewable technology is at least as economic as will be evidenced by an LCOE 
incorporating backup generation. 
To partially address the issue of potentially overestimating the backup cost of wind at lower 
penetration levels, we include wind without backup technology. Electricity generated from this 
technology is limited by employing a supply schedule that fits a constant elasticity supply curve 
through the following two points: (i) the least cost wind site, and (ii) the cost for generating 
electricity with the wind with natural gas backup technology at a level that corresponds to 5% of 
current levels of electricity generation in a given region. The “effective” supply curve of wind 
represented in the model is thus a combination of wind electricity generated with 0% backup at 
lower output levels and with 100% (natural gas) backup at higher output levels. 
Despite this flexibility, the fundamental shortcoming of the “top-down” approach—positing 
that wind electricity at large scales can only be generated with a 100% backup capacity—still 
persists. While a more elaborated approach is likely to find that less than 100% backup is needed, 
it has to make explicit the system costs associated with high penetration levels of wind including 
transmission and distribution costs, end-user/storage costs, and costs imposed by meeting various 
reserve requirements. 
4.2 Integrating a “Bottom-up” Electricity Model in a CGE Framework: The USREP-
ReEDS Model 
The “bottom-up” version of the electricity sector is based on the National Renewable 
Laboratory’s ReEDS (Renewable Energy Deployment System) model (Short et al., 2009). ReEDS 
is a linear programming model that simulates the least-cost expansion of electricity generation 
capacity and transmission in the contiguous U.S. ReEDS provides a means of estimating the type 
and location of conventional and renewable resource development, the transmission infrastructure 
expansion requirements of those installations, the composition and location of generation, storage, 
and demand-side technologies needed to maintain system reliability. 
ReEDS provides a detailed treatment of electricity generating and electricity storage 
technologies, and specifically addresses a variety of issues related to renewable energy 
technologies, including accessibility and cost of transmission, regional quality of renewable 
resources, seasonal and diurnal generation profiles, variability and non-dispatchability of wind 
and solar power, and the influence of variability on curtailment of those resources. ReEDS 
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addresses these issues through a highly discretized regional structure, temporal resolution, 
explicit statistical treatment of the variability in wind and solar output over time, and 
consideration of ancillary services requirements and costs. 
Rausch and Mowers (2014) embed the ReEDS model within the general equilibrium 
framework underlying the USREP model by employing a block decomposition algorithm put 
forward by Böhringer and Rutherford (2008). The virtue of this integrated approach is that 
electric-sector optimization—comprising electricity supply and demands for fuels, capital, labor 
and other inputs—is fully consistent with the equilibrium response of the macro-economic 
system—comprising electricity demand, fuel prices, and goods and factor prices). More details 
on the integrated top-down electricity model can be found in Rausch and Mowers (2014). 
4.3 Model Comparison 
Table 9 compares welfare costs, cumulative CO2 emissions, and electricity price impacts 
obtained from the two alternative electricity models for each respective electricity-sector policy. 
Focusing first on the CES policy, the comparison suggests that both models produce roughly 
comparable net present value (NPV) welfare costs at the aggregated level. USREP with a “top-
down” formulation of electricity estimates that NPV welfare costs of a federal CES policy are 
US$ trillion 2.08 whereas the USREP-ReEDS model suggests slightly lower costs at US$ trillion 
1.97. Both models somewhat disagree on the amount of cumulative economy-wide CO2 
emissions reductions over the 2012–2050 period with the USREP-ReEDS model projecting 
about 16 Gt or about 50% higher emissions reductions. This can be explained by differences in 
the electricity generation mix shown in Figure 10. By 2050, the USREP-ReEDS forecasts that 
almost all coal generation capacity will have retired or be idle and a substantial fraction of 
electricity is generation from nuclear power; in the model with a “top-down” electricity sector, 
the expansion of nuclear is limited by a nuclear phase-out constraint that is part of the scenario 
assumptions of the EMF24 study. 
Table 9. Model comparison of key variables. 
 USREP with “top-down” 
electricity sector 
USREP-ReEDS 
model 
 RPS CES RPS CES 
Net present value welfare costs 
($trillions) 1.64 2.08 0.91 1.97 
Cumulative 2012-2050 CO2 emissions 
reductions (%) 8.40 10.60 7.10 17.00 
Electricity price impacts 
relative to baseline (%) 
Year 2030 6.00 7.30 0.70 5.30 
Year 2050 4.70 10.00 7.10 13.60 
Comparing electricity generation from renewable sources, it should be noted that the 
simplified “top-down” model only considers wind and biomass, while the USREP-ReEDS model 
includes all major renewable energy technologies including utility-scale photovoltaics (PV), 
concentrated solar power (CSP), and geothermal. These are represented by the category “other 
renewables” in Figure 10. While the USREP-ReEDS model suggests slightly higher deployment 
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of wind and other renewables in 2030, both models largely agree in 2050, with the “top-down” 
approach suggesting a level of wind energy that is comparable to the sum of wind and other 
renewables projected by the USREP-ReEDS model. Electricity price impacts projected by the 
two models are similar with the USREP-ReEDS model yielding slightly higher price impacts 
relative to the BAU baseline (13.6%) than the “top-down” model (10.0%) in 2050. 
 
Figure 10. Model comparison of U.S. electricity generation by fuel. 
Differences between the “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches become more apparent if 
one focuses on the RPS policy as this instrument targets only renewable energy technologies and 
rules out that “clean” fossil-based technologies and nuclear power can be used to meet the 
energy standard. Figure 10 shows that both modeling approaches project very similar levels of 
electricity generation from non-renewable energy sources and hydro by 2030 and 2050. While 
the projected amounts of wind electricity are again similar under both approaches, other 
renewables—which are not included in the “top-down” approach—contribute about 3.5 EJ (out 
of 20 EJ of total electricity production) in 2050 under the “bottom-up” approach. The inclusion 
of additional flexibility to meet the RPS translates into significantly lower estimates of economic 
costs associated with the RPS policy: if the “bottom-up” approach is used, NPV welfare costs are 
44% lower as compared to the “top-down” CGE representation. Finally, both models produce 
similar projections in terms of CO2 emissions reductions under the RPS policy case. Figure 11 
compares the regional electricity generation mix by fuel across both models. Several points are 
worth noting. 
First, while—not surprisingly—both approaches predict a somewhat different picture in terms 
of the regional electricity generation mix, for most regions the differences remain relatively 
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small, thus being consistent with the fact that national-level results have been found to be largely 
similar. Focusing on electricity from wind only, relatively large disagreements between both 
models only exist for the NCENT region in 2030 and for the NEAST, NCENT and TX regions in 
2050. Second, other non-wind renewables play a relatively modest role—with the exception of 
CA which deploys significant amount of geothermal and solar power in the USREP-ReEDS 
model by 2050—in terms of the electricity generation mix (not for costs as was noted above). 
Third, both models are relatively similar by 2030 but differences are more pronounced in 2050. 
Fourth, both models also produce a somewhat different picture in terms of fossil-based electricity 
generation among regions. 
 
Figure 11. Model comparison of regional electricity generation by fuel. 
In summary, we conclude that the “top-down” approach produces very similar national-level 
welfare costs and electricity generation mix for the CES policy compared to the more tailored 
“bottom-up” approach. Discrepancies among both approaches for the RPS policy case are largely 
due to the fact that the “top-down” model does not consider other, non-wind renewable energy 
technologies. These could be easily added to the model following a similar approach as for wind, 
and would therefore likely bring cost estimates from both approaches more in line. At the 
regional level, the two approaches are largely consistent in terms of where significant 
investments in wind capacity/generation will occur. For a few regions, projections across both 
approaches yield discrepancies with respect to the electricity generation mix suggesting that a 
simplified “top-down” approach does not adequately describe the relevant “bottom-up” 
constraints in these regions. 
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We believe that this exercise has provided some first evidence that a parsimoniously specified 
“top-down” approach to modeling electricity generation can provide results that are, at least at 
the aggregated level, consistent with those obtained from a structurally more explicit “bottom-
up” approach. As this depends on how well the responses of a CGE model would be calibrated to 
those from a bottom-up model, one can of course not generalize this finding to any generic top-
down model. However, this rebuts to some extent the criticism put forward by modelers arguing 
that the lack of detail in “top-down” CGE models to represent critical features of the power 
system, especially with respect to large-scale intermittent renewable electricity generation, 
makes these models an inappropriate tool to study these issues. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has investigated both the efficiency and distributional impacts of a representative 
set of climate policy scenarios under consideration in the United States, developed as part of the 
EMF24 modeling exercise. This paper moves beyond the canonical result that market-based 
instruments produce superior welfare outcomes to examine in detail the distributional impacts of 
a range of policy options. We apply an empirically-calibrated model of the U.S. economy with 
disaggregated regions and income categories, and with a rich description of the energy system 
including advanced technology detail. We further include a sensitivity analysis that provides 
initial evidence of the robustness of model outputs to the inclusion of technology and market 
detail at various levels of resolution. 
The market-based instrument we model, a cap–and–trade system, yields superior welfare 
outcomes and also provides an effective mechanism for reducing the distributional impacts. The 
cost advantage can be directly traced to abatement flexibility across gases, sectors, technologies, 
and time, and is reinforced by the ability to recycle revenues as lump-sum transfers to 
households on a per-capita basis. Relative to a cap–and–trade system, regulatory policies are 
highly constrained in terms of the abatement opportunities available and the time frame on which 
these opportunities can be pursued. Even if limited flexibility provisions are added to regulatory 
policies, low cost opportunities are still limited by the policy scope. A fuel economy policy for 
new light-duty vehicles that introduces credit trading across manufacturers and extends banking 
and borrowing provisions will not change the fact that petroleum or emissions can only be 
reduced through measures that raise vehicle efficiency. The marginal costs of reducing electricity 
or transport emissions quickly exceed the marginal cost of reductions that would be incentivized 
under an equivalent cap–and–trade system. The flexibility and revenue redistribution potential 
under a cap–and–trade policy is a powerful advantage. 
Regional variation in welfare impacts is significant, both across regions for a given policy and 
across different policies. Our results suggest that welfare impacts are more evenly spread under 
the cap–and–trade policy, given that reductions are spread across many sectors and as such do 
not unduly burden regions based on their relative advantages and disadvantages in terms of 
abatement costs and opportunities. Revenue recycling also helps to reduce burdens across all 
regions in the cap-and-trade case. By contrast, some regions are limited in their ability to respond 
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to mandates that require action by sector or technology and thus face high costs, if these policies 
encourage costly reductions that would not have otherwise been pursued. This analysis 
underscores that regulatory policies can exaggerate the difference between winners and losers, 
by focusing on action in particular sectors or technologies and sparing others, while a cap–and–
trade system calls forth action (albeit perhaps less aggressive) from across the economy and 
energy system. 
In terms of variation in policy impact across income groups, our analysis finds that an 
electricity policy is regressive, while transport and cap–and–trade policies are moderately 
progressive. It is plausible that a transport policy (the only one of the policies we consider that is 
currently implemented at the national level) may be politically attractive because of its 
progressive nature and the fact that it exerts downward pressure on gasoline prices. These price 
reductions hide the true cost to households of efficiency improvements required, and improved 
fuel efficiency encourages consumers to drive more rather than less. Evidence of the regressive 
nature of electricity policies, by contrast, may discourage their broader acceptance. 
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